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Introduction
The idea behind this article is to examine the workings of the Korean
judicial system in the area of international commercial transactions. The
author, an American lawyer, is interested in seeing how foreign companies
fare when they try to cash in or defend their legal rights in the courts of the
Republic of Korea. The method used was to search the published decisions
of the supreme and high courts of the Republic of Korea for recent deci-
sions involving foreign companies doing business in Korea.
Reported cases involving foreign companies are few, but, of such cases,
the greatest number involves trademark litigation. Therefore, the scope of
this article is limited to trademark litigation involving foreign companies
doing business in the Republic of Korea, and the conclusions drawn are
limited and tentative.
Although the area of trademark litigation was chosen for study by
default, it may not be a bad place to start. This area holds interest both for
foreign businessmen who wish to see their industrial property rights pro-
tected and for the Koreans who have chosen to accumulate capital for
development by attracting foreign investment. Tension is created by the
conflicting goals of inducing foreign business while trying to encourage and
protect indigenous industry and commerce.
By way of introduction, the reader might want to know that the Republic
of Korea has formed two major strategies to accumulate capital for mod-
ernization. The legal expressions of the first were the land reforms of 1948
and 1950,1 designed to solve two problems at once: to defuse incipient rural
rebellion by conveying land title to the tillers, and to put capital in the
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hands of the former landlords, generally the educated class, so that they
could become the new class of entrepreneurs. 2 It is difficult to say whether
this scheme would have worked, but the Korean War intervened, and,
although a major portion of the land was transferred, the entrepreneurial
class didn't produce much enterprise. Wartime inflation wiped out most of
them. 3
If not local capital, then foreign capital would have to be the answer.
South Korea induced foreign countries to invest heavily, setting up a com-
prehensive system of regulations under a series of new statutes: the Foreign
Exchange Control Law, Foreign Capital Inducement Law4 and export and
import controls. The success of this second strategy is well documented, 5
but it has put the Koreans in the ambiguous position of trying to protect
their own businessmen and consumers while encouraging foreigners. The
Koreans have sound reasons for being sensitive to the issue of foreign dom-
ination. We might expect this attitude to influence the workings of the legal
system.
For one thing, the new statutes and regulations were laid over the Civil
Code which had been left behind by the Japanese. 6 This code itself rested
on the surface of the Korean polity. Because the modern legal system lacks
anchors in Korean experience, lawyers and scholars wonder to what extent
foreigners should rely on the legal process. Donald Meyer, an American
lawyer who has spent time in Korea, warns us that industrial property
rights enjoy diminished protection in Korea, in part because of unpredict-
ability of interpretation of the laws. He asks us to study the Bayer Aspirin
case. 7 And a Korean legal scholar, Dr. Alexander Kim, gives us the follow-
ing analysis:
While complex commercial laws and regulations exist, designed to shape virtually
all aspects of commercial life, neither laws nor administrative regulations have
yet developed the function that they serve in the more highly institutionalized
commercial systems of developed nations. This can be both a disadvantage and
an advantage to foreign investors and others doing business in Korea. On the one
hand, it means that there is a certain degree of unpredictability, since the specific
wording of laws and regulations will often be ignored by those delegated to
enforce and administer the regulations.
On the other hand, it also means that if a certain investment or transaction is
desired by Korea, no legal provision will be interpreted so as to bar or hinder
successful arrangements. Indeed, the major factor which prevents the system
2J.H. Cho, Post-1945 Land Reforms and Their Consequences 22 (Indiana University Ph.D.
dissertation, 1964).
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from operating in a chaotic manner is that the policy purposes behind the regula-
lions are broadly and generally understood by administrative personnel, so that
these purposes, rather than the specific wording of the regulations, are what is
actually administered. [Emphasis added.]
It should be noted that we are dealing here with the administrative aspects of
laws and regulations in Korea rather than judicial enforcement and interpreta-
tion. This is because in Korea, as in other East Asian countries, it is usually
unwise to try to enforce legal provisions through court action. While the courts
will enforce the law quite honestly and explicitly, the very act of going to court
tends to create antagonism, so that business dealings may be considered at an
end. Therefore, it is much more important to predict what the administration will
do than to consider possible judicial remedies. 8
But the Koreans and the foreigners do take their disputes to court, and
selected decisions of the supreme and high courts are available for analysis.
Let us look to see what happens in one area of law when the old Japanese
code, the new statutes, and free-floating ideas of policy, "broadly and gen-
erally understood," are applied to disputes involving Korean and foreign
businesses. We will be looking to see if rights can be identified and if rights
can be enforced. We will look at the Bayer case, but, before we discuss it,
we should examine the legal framework in which it arose.
Trademark Law in Korea
There are different answers to the question, "Why does the law protect
trademarks?" To protect the public against imitation goods which may be
of inferior quality, is one answer; to protect a property right of the manu-
facturer, is another. To protect both in varying degrees is the common
compromise. The more a legal system stresses protection of the public, the
more restrictions one would expect to find on transfer of a trademark.
United States law allows assignment of the mark together with at least part
of the goodwill of the business associated with the mark.9 The U.S. statute
is almost silent as to licensing, but case law tells us that licensing is allowed
with proper supervision by the licensor.10
The Japanese code language, retained in the Korean statute until 1974,11
was similar to the language in the U.S. law, that is, a mark could be
assigned with the business. Japan amended its trademark law in 1959 to
specifically provide a mechanism for licensing, 12 but Korean law did not
address this issue until 1974. Therefore, before 1974, the foreign investor
who wished to license the use of his trademark to a Korean enterprise or to
his own subsidiary in Korea, couldn't be sure that his right would be identi-
fied or protected under Korea law. Or could he? The Foreign Capital
'J.A. Kim, South Korea. A Summary of the Exisiing Legal System, CURRENT LEGAL
ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN THE FAR EAST (Allison ed. 1972).
'15 U.S.C. § 1060.
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Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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'
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Inducement law appeared to permit trademark licensing as part of a tech-
nological inducement contract approved by the Economic Planning Board.
The importation of a cash loan, capital goods or technology under the cash loan
contract, capital goods inducement contract authorized under paragraph 1, shall
be deemed permitted by such authorization. 13
At least one commentator assumed that this provision permitted licensing,
at least in the case of a foreign company.
However, the Foreign Capital Inducement Law sets up a provision that license
from foreigners to Koreans may be made without the transfer of business. This
law opened up a new vista to foreign investors as well as to Koreans. 14
The original Foreign Capital Promotion Law contained a clause which
gave it supremacy over other laws which might limit foreign investment,'-
but this provision was repealed in 1966 with the enactment of the Foreign
Capital Inducement Law. 16
In 1974, the Trademark Law was amended to permit licensing of a trade-
mark in certain circumstances when approved by the Patent Bureau and the
Economic Planning Board. 17 The question of licensing appeared to be
answered, but the doubts created by the old statutory scheme remained for
technology inducement contracts concluded before 1974.
One may say that the Trademark Law induces foreign technology and
investment by permitting licensing of trademarks and protects the domestic
economy by making each technology inducement contract containing a
trademark license subject to review by the Economic Planning Board.' 8
The statutory remedy for illegal transfer or permissive use by another
under Korean law is cancellation of registration of the mark. This is an
administrative procedure which may be instituted by the Patent Bureau or
by any interested party.t 9
Remedies for infringement include both civil and penal measures. Civil
damages include loss of profits and triple damages. 20 Injunctive relief is
available, not through the Trademark Law, but under the general provi-
'
3Laws of Republic of Korea, Trademark Law, art. 17 (3) (1969).
14B.H. LEE, KOREAN PATENT AND TRADEMARK 58 (1968).
'
5 Haptong, Jeongmilhwahag Jusighwoesa-v. Bayer A.G., 24:2 Daebeobweon Pangyeoljib 89
(ROK Supreme Court, June 22, 1976), at 90 (text of statute set out in Korean).
'
7Laws of Republic of Korea, Trademark Law, art. 29 (1975).
"It is interesting to compare this approach with the scheme of the new Mexican trademark
statute which requires each foreign mark to be joined with a Mexican mark. Vargas, Major
Innovations Regarding Trade and Service Marks in the Newly Revised Mexican Law on Inven-
tions and Marks-A Mexican Perspective, 66 TRADEMARK REP. 188, (1976). But B.H. Lee
reports that it is easier to get ministerial approval in Korea, too, when the foreign mark is
combined with a Korean mark. Licensing of Foreign Trademarks in Korea, I KOREAN L.J. 10,
(1980).
" Laws of Republic of Korea, Trademark Law, art. 23 (1969).
2
"Id. art. 30.
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sions of the Civil Code. 2 1 In addition, infringement is punishable by
imprisonment of up to five years. 2
2
An applicant need not show prior use as he must under U.S. law, but
continuous use after registration is required. 23 Marks are renewable at ten-
year intervals. 24 In contrast, the term of an approved inducement agree-
ment is usually three years. 25 So the additional question arises of the dura-
tion of protection for a trademark license under the old law.
26
A Headache for Bayer Aspirin
Within this statutory framework, the case of Hapbong Chemical v. Bayer,
A. G., arose.27 Bayer of Germany had been doing business in Korea since
the 1950s, and the Patent Bureau had approved registration of the mark,
Aspirin, in 1959 and had renewed it in 1969. Under a technical assistance
contract in 1971, Bayer of Germany had licensed the mark to Bayer of
Korea with the approval of the Economic Planning Board, but the mark
had not been registered to Bayer of Korea because no mechanism existed at
that time for such a license. 28 After the new law came into effect in 1974,
Bayer of Germany applied for and received registration of the license with
the Patent Bureau. Bayer of Korea then successfully enjoined an infringer
of the mark in a case decided by the High Court in 1975.29
Haptong Chemical challenged the registration of the trademark of Bayer
of Germany, asking that the registration be cancelled. Haptong alleged that
Bayer of Germany had allowed another, namely Bayer of Korea, the sub-
sidiary, to use the mark. Bayer's response was that Economic Planning
Board Approval protected the licensing arrangement, pointing to the lan-
guage of supremacy in the original version of the Foreign Capital Induce-
ment Law. The court stated that the issue of the term aspirin as a generic
term was not before it.
So, the question was whether the Foreign Capital Inducement Law upon
which Bayer said it had relied was firm enough to support its rights in the
trademark, Aspirin.
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the PatentCourt cancelling
the trademark' for the reason that Bayer of Germany had permitted
21B.H. LEE, KOREAN PATENT AND TRADEMARK 46 (1968).
2 Laws of Republic of Korea, Trademark Law, art. 32 (1969).
211d. art. 45 (3) (1975).241d. art. 17 (1969).
2 B.H. Lee, Report on Current Trademark Practices in Korea, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 46, 49
(1977).
21B.H. Lee, in his Korean Law Journal article, supra, note 18, cites Economic Planning
Board Rule 94 which proclaims that, when the technical assistance permit expires, the trade-
mark also expires. Whether the EPB has this authority is a good question in light of the Bayer
case, to be discussed later in this paper, and cited, supra, at note 15.
"7Haptong v. Bayer, supra.
'"67 TRADEMARK REP., supra, at 49.
2 Bayer Jusighwoesa v. Taepyeongyang Hwahag Gongeob Jusighwoesa, 23 Godeung
Beobweon Panyejib 142 (High Court, September 5, 1975).
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another, Bayer of Korea, to use the mark, even though the Economic Plan-
ning Board had approved the arrangement.
... we do not disagree with the facts found by the lower court that the appellant
allowed the trademark, "aspirin," to be used by another... and, since we cannot
say that the lower court's decision is in error in not seeing the evidence as nothing
but an indication of technical assistance, [we reject counsel's argument.] 30
Counsel for Bayer was understandably upset over this decision.3' An
American lawyer has cited this case for the proposition that industrial prop-
erty rights enjoy diminished protection in Korea. It can't be denied that
Bayer didn't get the protection it was seeking. But before we dismiss the
Korean Supreme Court's decision out of hand, we should take a closer look
at the case.
Had Bayer sought legal advice in 1971 when it was submitting its techni-
cal assistance contract for Economic Planning Board approval, what might
it have heard? Of course, the advice depends in part on the attitude of the
legal advisor toward the Korean legal system.
If the legal advisor were to ignore the specific wording of the statute in
favor of policy purposes, "broadly and generally understood," he might tell
Bayer not to be too concerned with the fact that the trademark law at that
time offered no protection for licensing. Since the broad government policy
was to induce foreign capital, one would expect a policy of protecting a
trademark licensing arrangement once approved by the Economic Planning
Board.
On the other hand, if the advisor were so nearsighted as to stick to the
terms of the statutes, he would have to warn Bayer that it might be chal-
lenged by either "any interested party," or by the Patent Bureau since it was
allowing another to use its trademark without registering this arrangement
with the Patent Bureau. Remember that Bayer of Germany had registered
the mark at a time when the Foreign Capital Inducement Law, by its own
terms, superseded other statutes, but that, at the time when the licensing
agreement was approved by the Economic Planning Board, the FCIL had
been amended to remove the superseding provision, and that the Trade-
mark Law, by its own terms, did not provide for licensing. One might con-
clude that Bayer of Germany had an identifiable right to use the trademark,
Aspirin, but that no such right was created in Bayer of Korea under Korean
statutes in effect at that time.
Looking again at the decision, can we say that the Court was influenced
by nonlegal concerns such as the language purification movement 32 or the
desire to protect domestic business against foreign domination? Whatever
the political climate may have been at the time the case was decided, the
decision rests on sufficient legal grounds, in this writer's opinion. The
court's decision, although not in line with the "broadly and generally
'°Haptong v. Bayer, supra, at 91-92.
1167 TRADEMARK REP., supra.
32(d.
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understood" policy of inducing foreign investment, is correct on the law.
This may be the kind of decision which only a lawyer could love, but the
result should not be totally unexpected. This was a case where the sup-
posed right was not perfected according to the statutory law in effect at the
time approval was received from the Economic Planning Board. The Eco-
nomic Planning Board did not have the clear power, in a legal sense, to
permit licensing otherwise clearly prohibited.
Other Trademark Litigation
Article 45 of the new Trademark Law provides that a mark shall be can-
celled if it hasn't been used on the designated commodity within the coun-
try for one year or longer "without a legitimate reason." In the case of Dae
Han General Foods v. General Foods Corp., the Supreme Court was faced
with the question of whether import restrictions preventing sale of goods
bearing the mark were included within the term, legitimate reason.
33
Dae Han brought an action seeking to cancel General Foods' trademark
after import restrictions had kept General Foods out of the market for more
than one year. The Supreme Court refused to cancel the mark, ruling that
import restrictions, like force majeure, constituted a legitimate reason for
not using the mark.
In a companion case involving the same parties, General Foods was
unsuccessful in preventing Dae Han from using the name Korea General
Foods Co., Ltd. The Supreme Court reasoned that the addition of "Korea"
and "Co., Ltd." to the term "general foods" gave the mark sufficient distinc-
tiveness and stated that since "general foods" just means 'yonghab sigpum,
[i.e., 'general foods,']" these two words were not considered to be the essen-
tial part of the mark.
34
In a decision of the Patent Office Trial Court in 1978, Pierre Cardin, the
French designer, was able to cancel the registration of the term "Pierre Car-
din" as a trademark. Two Koreans had registered this term in 1973, obvi-
ously hoping to cash in on this famous name. The Patent Court relied on
article 5 of the former trademark law which prohibited registration of a
mark which is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive. 35
The other reported trademark cases involving foreign companies deal
with linguistic quibbling of the type common in trademark cases through-
out the world. Seven-up has not had much luck, at least in the cases of
"Daehan Jonghab Sigpum Jusighwoesa v. General Foods Corp., 25:3 Daebeobweon
Pangyeoljib 164, (Supreme Court, December 27, 1977).
3 General Foods Corp. v. Daehan Jonghab Sigpum Jusighwoesa 26:1 Daebeobweon
Pangyeoljib 1, (Supreme Court, January 10, 1978).
"Summarized at 69 TRADEMARK REP. 94 (1978).
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record, in its efforts to prevent other beverages from using the word "up" in
their names. Both Bubble-up 36 and S.C. Cider-up,37 have been permitted.
"Kelodin" was held to be too close to "Keflodin, '"38 "Buseupen" was distin-
guished from "Buscopan," 39 "Arovit" was too close to "Arbid,"'40 and
"P & H" was held to lack sufficient distinctiveness. 4'
Conclusion
Since the sample is limited and diverse, the conclusions must be limited
and tentative. It has been said that the great discretion given to Korean
administrative agencies makes it difficult, if not impossible to give sound
legal advice to clients who want to know about their rights. Koreans and
foreigners may be hesitant to try to cash in their rights in court, seeking to
maintain good relations with their business contacts and with the
government.
They may end up in court anyway, however. The limited sample
analysed in this article indicates that when the litigants get to court, they
shouldn't be surprised to find the court applying the law. A litigant should
not expect to be saved by policy where a clear right does not exist in the
statutes.
So a legal advisor, in addition to warning his clients of the vicissitudes of
the bureaucracy, must be sure to anchor his clients' rights firmly in the law.
The anchoring may not insure the recognition of rights in all cases, but it is
a necessary prerequisite. One cannot presume that policies, broadly and
generally understood, will suffice in litigation in the Republic of Korea.
3 Summarized at 11C Abstracts No. 387/72, Korea. (1972).
3 Seven-up Co. v. Jusighwoesa Seoul Saida, 27:3 Daebeobweon Pangyeoljib 110 (Supreme
Court, December 26, 1979).
3 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Jusighwoesa Yuhanyanghaeng 27:1 Daebeobweon Pangyeoljib 14
(Supreme Court, January 23, 1979).
3
"C.H. Beringson [?] v. Samseong Jeyag Gongeob Jusighwoesa, 25:3 Daebeobweon
Pangyeoljib 31 (Supreme Court, September 28, 1977).
"Director of Patent Bureau v. Toropen [?], Berikedin [?], Kurake [?] and Co., 25:1 Daebe-
obweon Pangyeoljib 28 (Supreme Court, March 22, 1977).
"Director of Patent Bureau v. Hanis Chipego [?], 27:3 Daebeobweon Pangyeoljib 105
(Supreme Court, December 11, 1979).
